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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Government spends approximately $500 billion per year 
on procurement actions to support government work, including contracts 
for products and services.1  Roughly eighty percent of those contracts are 
awarded to small businesses.2  With the rise of the Internet, initiating a 
contract with the Federal Government has become easier than ever through 
the use of on-line electronic portals, known as e-tools,3 that provide 
efficient and cost-effective means to do business with the government.4  
Despite the ease of access, the execution of a government contract is a 
complicated process.5  Businesses who choose to engage in government 
contracts become subject to federal statutes and regulations, including the 
Anti-Kickback Act (Act), 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-55 (1986), that may be new or 
foreign to the normal course of business and may leave small businesses 
with the burden of compliance that is excessive and beyond its functional 
capabilities.6 
Even though an individual contract may set out penalties for the 
violation of its terms, many times the incorporated regulations include civil 
penalties beyond the parameters of the contract.7  Civil penalties clauses, 
like the one in the Act, set forth monetary damages that the government 
may recover from violators under two conditions: 1) outright violations, 
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1.  For Venders—Getting on Schedule, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., 
http://gsa.gov/portal/content/198473 (last updated Jan. 7, 2015). 
2. Id. 
3. Some examples of e-tools include: GSA Advantage!, eBuy, eOffer/eMod, FedBizOpps, Schedule 
Sales Query, GSA Global Supply, and GSA Reverse Auctions. e-Tools Overview,  U.S. GEN. 
SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104555? (last update Mar. 3, 2015).    
4. See Resources, Training and Tools, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., 
http://gsa.gov/portal/content/203017 (last updated Jan. 12, 2015).  
5. See generally Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.000-1.707 (2013). 
6. The precise regulations that apply to each contract are specified within the terms and conditions of 
the contract.  Id.  Because each contract is different, the applicable regulations vary.  Id.  
7. See 41 U.S.C. § 55 (1986), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706 (2011). 
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and 2) knowing violations of the statute.8  The civil penalty provision at § 
55 of the Act states: 
(a) Amount.—The Federal Government in a civil action may recover 
from a person— 
that knowingly engages in conduct prohibited by section [53] 9 of this title 
a civil penalty equal to— 
  twice the amount of each kickback involved in the violation; and 
  not more than $10,000 for each occurrence of prohibited conduct; and  
whose employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee violates 
section [53] of this title by providing, accepting, or charging a kickback a 
civil penalty equal to the amount of that kickback.10 
Section 55(a)(2) imposes a civil penalty in the amount of the kickback 
for outright violations of the Act.11  Section 55(a)(1) imposes a higher 
penalty of twice the amount of the kickback plus additional per-occurrence 
forfeitures for knowing violations.12  Knowing violations of a statute are 
typically penalized more harshly because they involve a scienter13 
requirement that is typically reserved for criminal punishments.14  The 
scienter analysis is complicated for a corporate violator because the court 
must determine what the corporation “knows.”15   
In order to hold a corporation liable for “knowing” violations, the 
Fifth Circuit and other courts have historically applied common law rules of 
agency and have held employers liable for the torts of employees who act 
within the scope of their employment or for the benefit of the employer.16  
However, in United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., a 
case of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, the Circuit Court held that 
liability could be imputed upon a corporation for knowing violations of the 
Anti-Kickback Act regardless of whether the violating employee was acting 
                                                                                                                 
8. Id.  
9. 41 U.S.C. § 53 (1986), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8702 (2011) (prohibiting any person from 
providing, attempting or offering to provide, soliciting, accepting, or attempting to accept a 
kickback or charging the amount of the kickback to any government contractor or subcontractor). 
10. Id. § 55, amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706.   
11.  Id.  
12.  Id. 
13. Scienter is defined as “[a] degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the 
consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act’s having been done knowingly . . . .”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (9th ed. 2009). 
14. 41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706. 
15. United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 354 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(Jolly, J., concurring). 
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958); see also United States v. Ridglea State 
Bank, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966); Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 
(5th Cir. 1962). 
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within the scope of his employment or for the benefit of the corporation.17  
This holding opens the door for excessive corporate liability for the actions 
of employees at all levels of the corporate ladder.18   
This Note argues that, in Kellogg, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit inappropriately determined that vicarious liability could 
be imputed to a corporation under § 55(a)(1) of the Act by dismissing its 
punitive characteristics and disregarding the application of the act-for-the-
benefit-of-the-principal rule of agency.  Section II provides a background of 
the treatment of punitive damages and the application of vicarious liability 
under similar federal statutes.  Section III discusses the facts and findings of 
the Fifth Circuit in Kellogg.  Finally, Section IV argues why the court 
inappropriately applied vicarious liability under § 55(a)(1) of the Act by 
dismissing its punitive characteristics and disregarding the application of 
the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal doctrine.  
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Government contracts with commercial entities19 to fulfill its 
requirements for services and supplies.20  These contracts must conform to 
the rules of the Federal Acquisition Regulations.21  Depending on the 
services or supplies being acquired, government contracts vary from simple 
acquisitions to complex contracts.22  Each contract has a different structure 
and cost scheme.23  Requirements contracts are those established to fulfill 
the requirements of a government entity when those future needs cannot be 
clearly defined.24  One type of requirements contract is an indefinite 
delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract.25   
IDIQ contracts provide for an indefinite quantity of services or goods 
over a fixed period of time.26  These contracts are used when the 
Government cannot determine the precise quantities or timing of supplies or 
                                                                                                                 
17. Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 348–49. 
18. Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 498. 
19. Once a contract is formed, the commercial firm is known as a “prime contractor” because they 
hold the prime contract with the government. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 3.502-1 
(2014). 
20. Getting Started with GSA Purchasing Programs, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/105347?utm_source=FAS&utm_medium=print-
radio&utm_term=HDR_4_Prchsng_gettingstarted&utm_campaign=shortcuts (last visited Feb. 2, 
2015). 
21. See generally 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.000-1.707. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id.  
25. Id. § 16.504. 
26. Id.  
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services that are needed.27  Once the need is determined, the Government 
issues discrete task orders under the contract for contractor execution.28  
Although cost structures of IDIQ contracts differ, one common type of cost 
structure is “cost-plus.”29  Under a cost-plus contract, the contractor 
receives its cost of performance plus a predetermined markup, which is 
typically a percentage of cost.30  Under this type of cost structure, the 
Government bears the burden of shifting requirements or changes in market 
prices.31  In addition to the markup cost, the contractor also receives a fee 
for its services.32  This fee may be based on a sliding scale or be 
predetermined, depending on the terms of the contract.33 
No matter the type of contract awarded, the Government must include 
any applicable laws that affect the performance of the contract within the 
terms of the contract.34  These laws, known as “flow downs,” may be 
incorporated in full text within the contract or may only be incorporated by 
reference.35  As the term implies, these requirements must also “flow down” 
to any subcontractors acquired to assist in performance of the work.36  The 
Anti-Kickback Act must be included in every contract with a value 
exceeding $150,000.37 
The Anti-Kickback Act originated in 1946 in response to private 
companies paying government contractors kickbacks to gain valuable 
military subcontracts during World War II (WWII).38  A kickback is a type 
of commercial bribe where “a percentage of income is given to a person in 
a position of power or influence as payment for having made the income 
possible.”39  The Government, and ultimately the taxpayers, bore the burden 
of these WWII kickbacks because the subcontractor would include the 
amount in its invoice to the prime contractor, who would then up-charge the 
fee, in addition to any markups and award fees, to the Government.40  
                                                                                                                 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. See Id. § 16.304-.306. 
31. Id.  
32. Id.   
33. Id. 
34. Id. §§ 52.200-.253-1.  
35. Id.  Incorporation is a method of making a secondary document part of a primary document by 
including in the primary document a statement that the secondary document should be treated as if 
it were contained within the primary one.  Laws incorporated by reference are still in full force 
and effect under the contract.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 781 (9th ed. 2009).  
36. 48 C.F.R. § 52.203-6. 
37. Id. § 3.502-3. 
38. S. REP. NO. 99-435, at 3 (1986). 
39. Kickback, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/kickback?s=t (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2015). 
40. United States v. Acme Process Equip. Co., 385 U.S. 138, 143 (1966); United States v. Purdy, 144 
F.3d 241, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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Realizing the improper and unethical nature of these bribes, Congress 
passed the Act to prevent government contractors and subcontractors from 
accepting them.41   
The Act was amended in 1986 by the Anti-Kickback Enforcement 
Act, which was intended to strengthen the prohibition of kickbacks relating 
to government contracts.42  Before this amendment, when a contractor was 
found in violation of the statute, the Government was only allowed to 
collect the amount of the kickback.43  The amendments added a provision in 
the civil liability clause that allowed the Government to recover damages in 
the amount equal to double the value of the kickback plus $10,000 per 
occurrence, for knowing violations of the Act.44  The provision that 
addressed damages in the amount of the kickback was expanded from a 
single entity, individual, or corporation, to include any kickback received 
by an employee or subcontractor of that entity.45  The divergence of the 
original provision is the subject of Kellogg.46   
The relevant language found in § 55 of the Act at the time of the 
alleged violation is as follows: 
(a) Amount.—The Federal Government in a civil action may recover 
from a person— 
that knowingly engages in conduct prohibited by section 5347 of this title a 
civil penalty equal to— 
twice the amount of each kickback involved in the violation; and 
not more than $10,000 for each occurrence of prohibited conduct; and  
(2) whose employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee violates 
section 53 of this title by providing, accepting, or charging a kickback a 
civil penalty equal to the amount of that kickback.48 
 Because Kellogg was a case of first impression for the Fifth Circuit, 
no precedent existed to address the treatment of these two clauses with 
respect to the imposition of vicarious liability on a corporation whose 
employee violated the Act.49  Consequentially, the court examined the 
                                                                                                                 
41. Purdy, 144 F.3d at 242–43. 
42. Anti-Kickback Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-634, 100 Stat. 3523. 
43. 41 U.S.C. § 51 (1982), repealed by Anti-Kickback Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-634, 
100 Stat. 3523.   
44. Act of Nov. 7, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-634, § 5, 100 Stat. 3523 (1986); H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 10 
(1986). 
45. Act of Nov. 7, 1986 § 5; H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, supra note 44. 
46. See United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013). 
47. 41 U.S.C. § 53 (1986), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8702 (2011) (prohibiting any person from 
providing, attempting or offering to provide, soliciting, accepting, or attempting to accept a 
kickbacks or charging the amount of the kickback to any government contractor or subcontractor). 
48. Id. § 55, amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706.   
49. Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 344. 
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application of vicarious liability in federal statutes similar to the Anti-
Kickback Act.50   
A.  Vicarious Liability 
 Under § 55(a)(1) of the Anti-Kickback Act, the corporation must 
knowingly violate the Act in order to be liable for double damages and the 
per occurrence penalty.51  Because a corporation is a legal entity, it cannot 
of itself possess a mental state.52  History has shown that the acts and 
mental states of a corporation’s employees may be imputed upon the 
corporation if those employees acted to benefit the corporation.53  However, 
in cases where the damages sought are punitive in nature, the requisite 
mental state (scienter) cannot be imputed to a corporation.54   
1.  Act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal 
The act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal doctrine states that an agent is 
only authorized to act for the benefit of the principal, and he may not seek 
personal advantage through his actions as an agent.55  Based on Fifth 
Circuit precedent, vicarious liability may be imputed to a corporation when 
the employee is acting within the scope of his employment or for the 
benefit of the corporation.56  Historically, the Fifth Circuit has applied the 
act-to-benefit analysis to show that vicarious liability does not 
automatically arise under an employer/employee relationship.57  To satisfy 
the analysis, the corporation need not actually benefit from the actions of 
the employee, but the employee must have acted with the intent to benefit 
the corporation.58   
When evaluating whether a corporation could be held criminally liable 
for the unauthorized actions of its employees, the Fifth Circuit stated in 
Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States that the employee’s purpose to 
benefit the corporation is decisive to equate the employee’s actions with 
that of the corporation.59  If the act was performed with a view of furthering 
                                                                                                                 
50. Id. at 345. 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706. 
52. See 10 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 4877 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2012). 
53. Id. 
54. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 528 (1999). 
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39 cmt. a (1958). 
56. United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 1966). 
57. Id. at 498-99; Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962). 
58. Standard Oil, 307 F.2d at 128. 
59. Id. 
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the corporation’s business, then the expectation of benefit makes the act 
that of the principal.60   
Even though Standard Oil involved imputing criminal liability, the 
Fifth Circuit has extended its holding to civil actions based on statutory 
provisions that carry punitive penalties.61  In United States v. Ridglea, the 
court opined that a corporation could not acquire a specific wrongful intent 
through the actions of unfaithful servants who acted to advance the interests 
of parties other than their employer.62  In Ridglea, the executive vice 
president of a bank knowingly approved fraudulent Federal Housing 
Administration loans for which he received a percentage of the proceeds.63  
The court held that civil liability for the acts of the vice president could not 
be imputed to the bank because he was clearly acting to benefit himself.64  
The vice president’s approval of loans he knew would default was actually 
detrimental to the bank.65  Because he was not acting to benefit the bank, 
his actions and personal knowledge of his misdeeds were not imputed to the 
bank.66 
During the Vietnam War, the Fifth Circuit declined to hold a 
corporation liable in United States v. Hangar One, Inc., a case similar to 
Kellogg.67  In Hanger One, the defendant corporation held a contract with 
the Government to provide ammunition to support the Vietnam War.68 
While performing the contract, some of the corporation’s employees 
overlooked defects in the ammunition on the production line and allowed 
defective ammunition to be sold to the Government.69  Because there was 
no benefit in providing defective products to the Government, the circuit 
court held that the corporation was not liable for the actions of its 
employees because they were not acting to benefit the corporation.70  
2.  Damages   
Although courts are still divided as to whether statutory clauses 
allowing the government to recover “double damages” are punitive or 
remedial, the trend is moving toward considering these provisions 
                                                                                                                 
60. Id. 
61. Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 498. 
62. Id. (citing Standard Oil, 307 F.2d at 129); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 217D 
cmt. d, 235 (1958).   
63. Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 498. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1977). 
68. Id. at 1156. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1158. 
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punitive.71  Once a clause is declared punitive, it should be strictly 
construed to only impute the requisite scienter to a corporation when the 
authority of the actor is clear.72  
Dating back to 1818, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a principal 
cannot be held liable for punitive damages imposed due to the unauthorized 
misdeeds of its agents.73  Courts have consistently applied this doctrine over 
time in cases concerning general punitive damages and statutory clauses 
with punitive penalties.74 
In Hyslop v. United States, the Court held that statutory clauses that 
are punitive must be strictly construed to limit the imposition of vicarious 
liability upon a corporation.75  The policy behind such application is that 
punitive penalties are intended to punish the offender.76  As a result, it 
would be improper to punish a corporation for the actions of an employee 
that was not clearly acting on behalf of the corporation.77 
III.  EXPOSITION OF THE CASE 
In Kellogg, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
considered two questions: 1) whether 41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(2) extended 
vicarious liability to an employer for the acts of its employees and 2) if 
vicarious liability did apply, whether the Government adequately imputed 
that liability on Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. (“KBR”).78  In response to the 
first issue, the Fifth Circuit Court held that an employer could be held 
vicariously liable for the actions of its employees under 41 U.S.C. § 55 
(a)(2).79  As to the second issue, the court remanded to the trial court to 
determine whether the facts of this case justify imputed liability.80  This 
Note is limited to the first issue in Kellogg. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
71. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 532–33 (1999); see also United States v. Halper, 490 
U.S. 435, 447–49 (1989); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 93 (1997). 
72. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 532–33. 
73. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1818) (holding that actual wrongdoers in marine 
trespass are responsible for exemplary damages, but the owners of the privateers are not 
responsible beyond the actual loss or injury sustained). 
74. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 114-15 (1893); Dudley v. Wal-mart 
Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 1999); Harris v. L&L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 
983-85 (4th Cir. 1997); Hyslop v. United States, 261 F.2d 786, 792 (8th Cir. 1958). 
75. Hyslop, 261 F.2d at 792. 
76. Id. 
77. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544. 
78. United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 2013). 
79. Id. at 348–49. 
80. Id. at 351. 
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A.  Facts and Procedural Posture  
 KBR was a prime contractor who provided global logistical services 
to Army installations across the globe for the U.S. Department of 
Defense.81  KBR’s agreement with the government, known as the Logistics 
Civil Augmentation Program III (LOGCAP III), was structured as an IDIQ 
contract.82  The terms of LOGCAP III allowed KBR to bill the Army its 
cost of performance, including the cost of subcontractors, plus a one 
percent markup and an award fee of up to two percent.83  Under LOGCAP 
III, the Army would issue discrete task orders to KBR, which KBR could 
self-perform or perform through retention of subcontractors. 84 KBR 
engaged two subcontractors, EGL, Inc. (EGL) and Panalpina, Inc. 
(Panalpina), to assist in the execution of task orders issued between 2002 
and 2006 for the transportation of military equipment and supplies in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Kuwait.85 
According to the Government, KBR accepted kickbacks from both 
EGL and Panalpina in exchange for favorable treatment, including 
“overlooking service failures and continuing to award new subcontracts . . . 
despite such failures.”86  The allegations focus on KBR’s Corporate Traffic 
Supervisor for LOGCAP III, Robert Bennett.87  As the Corporate Traffic 
Supervisor, Bennett was responsible for the oversight of EGL and 
Panalpina and for approving invoices submitted by the two 
subcontractors.88  From 2002 to 2006, Bennett and four of his colleagues, 
who also worked in the transportation department, accepted kickbacks on at 
least ninety-three occasions from Kevin Smoot, managing director of 
EGL’s freight forwarding station, and other EGL employees who were 
acting under Smoot’s direction.89  These kickbacks included meals, drinks, 
golf outings, tickets to rodeo events, baseball games, football games, and 
other gifts and entertainment.90  From 2003 to 2006, Bennett accepted 
kickbacks from Panalpina through its account representative, Grant 
Wattman, and other employees acting under Wattman’s direction on at least 
                                                                                                                 
81. Id. at 344–45. 
82. Id. at 345. 
83. Id.  
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. (quoting Complaint of United States at 27–28, United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & 
Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 1:04CV00042), 2010 WL 3198716, at *27–28). 
87. Id.  
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
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fifty-five occasions.91 Like the EGL kickbacks, the Panalpina kickbacks 
included “meals, drinks, golf outings, and other gifts and entertainment.”92 
This action commenced when two individuals brought a qui tam 
action93 against KBR, Bennett, and others for the kickback scheme.94  In 
this case, the Government intervened and filed its own complaint alleging a 
violation of the Act under 41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1), among other claims.95  
KBR moved to dismiss the Government’s complaint on the ground that it 
failed to state a claim for civil liability because 41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) does 
not permit vicarious liability.96  The trial court agreed and granted KBR’s 
motion to dismiss stating that the plain language of § 55(a)(1) does not 
allow for vicarious liability, and the Government had not sufficiently 
alleged that KBR employees were acting for the company’s benefit.97  
Subsequently, the Government voluntarily dismissed all other claims and 
proceeded in this appeal solely on the § 55(a) claim.98 
B.  Majority Opinion 
Keeping in mind the procedural posture of this case, the Fifth Circuit 
Court only considered whether the district court properly granted KBR’s 
motion to dismiss.99  The entire premise of this suit lies within the language 
of the Act100 as it appeared during the term of KBR’s contract with the 
Department of Defense.101  Section 52(2) defined a “kickback” as: 
any money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or 
compensation of any kind that is provided to a prime contractor, prime 
contractor employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee to 
                                                                                                                 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. A qui tam suit is, 
a lawsuit that is brought by a private citizen against a person or company who is 
believed to have violated the law during performance under a government contract or 
in violation of a government regulation that allows for such suits.  In a qui tam suit, the 
private citizen is allowed to participate in the suit and receive a portion or all of the 
proceeds received as a result.  Modernly, this type of suit is more commonly referred 
to as a “whistle blower” case.  In certain cases, the Government may intervene and 
bring an action on its own right.   
 Qui Tam Action, LEGALDICTIONARY.COM, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/ 
qui+tam+action (last visited Nov. 11, 2014). 
94. Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 345. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 346. 
99. Id.  
100. 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-56 (1986), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8702 (2011). 
101. Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 346. 
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improperly obtain or reward favorable treatment in connection with a 
prime contract or a subcontract relating to a prime contract.102 
Section 53 stated that:  
A person may not—  
(1) provide, attempt to provide, or offer to provide a kickback; 
(2) solicit, accept, or attempt to accept a kickback; or 
(3) include the amount of a kickback prohibited by paragraph (1) or (2) in 
the contract price— 
(A) a subcontractor charges a prime contractor or a higher tier 
subcontractor; or 
(B) a prime contractor charges the Federal Government.103 
Section 52(3) defined “person” to include an “individual” and a 
“corporation, partnership, business association of any kind, trust, [or] joint-
stock company.”104  Section 55(a), the civil liability clause in question, 
stated:  
(a) Amount.—The Federal Government in a civil action may recover 
from a person— 
(1)  that knowingly engages in conduct prohibited by section 53 of this 
title a civil penalty equal to— 
twice the amount of each kickback involved in the violation; and 
not more than [$11,000]105 for each occurrence of prohibited conduct; and  
(2) whose employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee violates 
section 53 of this title by providing, accepting, or charging a kickback a 
civil penalty equal to the amount of that kickback.106 
The majority began its opinion with the statute’s legislative history and the 
1986 amendments to the Act.107  In those amendments, Congress added 
civil damages remedies in § 55(a)(1) by permitting recovery of double 
damages and per occurrence penalties from prime contractors who 
knowingly violate the Act.108  In § 55(a)(2), Congress added recovery of the 
value of the kickback from prime contractors and higher tier subcontractors 
                                                                                                                 
102. Id. (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 52(2), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8702). 
103. Id. at 348 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 53, amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8702). 
104. Id. at 346 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 52(3), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8702). 
105. “Acting under the authority of the Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 
1990, 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (2006), the Department of Justice increased the amount of the penalty in § 
55(a)(1)(B) from $10,000, its original statutory amount, to $11,000.  28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(13).”  Id. 
at 347 n.6. 
106. Id. at 346 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 55(a), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706). 
107. Id. at 347. 
108. Id. 
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for violations of their employees.109  Because the Government was only 
seeking damages under § 55(a)(1), the court only addressed the “double 
damages” portion of the statute.110 
1.  Does the Act extend vicarious liability to an employer for the acts of its 
employees? 
To interpret the language of the statute, the majority began with its 
plain meaning.111  The district court held that if vicarious liability were to 
apply to a corporation in § 55(a)(1), then it would render § 55(a)(2) 
superfluous. However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that 
assertion, distinguishing the double damages plus a per occurrence penalty 
for knowing violations of the Act, from the strict liability penalty for 
outright violations.112  As written, a corporation is strictly liable for the 
kickbacks accepted by its employees under § 55(a)(2), but also may be held 
liable for additional damages under § 55(a)(1) for knowing violations of the 
Act.113  The majority reasoned that it is entirely consistent for the statute to 
punish knowing violations more severely than those of which the 
corporation was unaware.114  As a result, the court held that § 55(a)(2) of 
the statute allows for imputation of vicarious liability to a corporation for 
knowing violations of the Act.115 
 In consideration of the second issue in the case, the court examined 
KBR’s arguments regarding the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal doctrine 
and the punitive nature of the damages sought by the Government in this 
case.116 
2.  Did the Government properly impute liability on KBR? 
The majority looked to the Restatement (Second) of Agency and case 
law to determine whether liability was properly imputed on KBR.117  
Generally, an employer is subject to liability for a tort committed by its 
employee who was acting within the scope of his employment.118  If the 
employee acted outside of his scope of employment, the principal may still 
be liable if the employee purported to act or to speak on behalf of the 
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principal, and the third party relied on the employee’s apparent authority.119  
In this case, the Government did not dispute that the employee was acting 
outside of his employment.120  Consequentially, KBR asserted that because 
the damages in § 55(a)(1) of the statute were punitive, the statute required a 
narrow application of liability imposed only by those employees who were 
acting for the benefit of the corporation.121   
a.  Act-for-the-Benefit-of-the-Principal  
The district court in Kellogg relied on the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-
principal analysis in United States v. Ridglea State Bank.122  In Ridglea, the 
Government was seeking double damages of $25,500 that were grossly 
disproportionate to its actual loss of $2,040.123  Because the offending 
employees could be criminally punished individually for their wrongful 
acts, the court held that punishing the corporation for the same misdeeds 
would offend the idea of double jeopardy124 because it would punish twice 
for the same wrongs.125  Subsequently, the Ridglea court borrowed the 
criminal law standard for vicarious liability under the double jeopardy 
theory and held that the knowledge of the agent not acting with a purpose to 
benefit the employer could be imputed to the employer when the individual 
is liable under another statute requiring knowledge or guilty intent.126  
Essentially, the knowledge of the employee could not, at the same time, be 
his individual knowledge and that of the corporation.127 
Refusing to adopt the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal test, the 
Kellogg majority reasoned that Ridglea was an isolated case that has not 
been followed in any other civil action.128  As an exception to the rule, the 
Kellogg majority held that Ridglea stood only to show that the court must 
examine the facts of the case to determine whether the remedy is proper.129 
                                                                                                                 
119. Id. at 349–50. 
120. Id. at 350. 
121. Id. at 345. 
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b.  Damages 
The majority distinguished the present case from Ridglea by pointing 
out that the False Claims Act applicable to that case contained a provision 
of a mandatory $2000 forfeiture.130  The court did not have the option to 
impose a lesser penalty.131  In this case, the Act allowed some flexibility 
where the court may impose up to the $11,000132 per occurrence penalty, 
but is not required to impose the entire penalty amount.133  As a result, the 
court found that the penalty available in the present case was not per se 
excessive in comparison to the actual kickbacks received because the court 
could tailor the penalty to the violation.134   
KBR claimed the damages available in § 55(a)(2) were punitive and 
therefore demanded a narrow application of vicarious liability.135  The 
majority disagreed and cited Cook County v. United States ex rel. 
Chandler136 which held that damages set forth by Congress in statutes such 
as these do not equate to classic punitive damages because they are limited 
to the maximum amounts set forth by statute.137  Contrarily, classic punitive 
damages leave the jury to decide the amount to be imposed.138  Therefore, 
the majority held that the restrictive view of vicarious liability was not 
proper in this case because the damages contained in the Act were not 
punitive in nature.139 
c.  Apparent Authority 
After rejecting the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal test and 
dismissing the punitive penalty of the Act, the majority turned to the 
decision in Association of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp. 
(ASME), which set out the elements required to assert vicarious liability 
under federal civil provisions.140  In ASME, the Court considered whether a 
non-profit organization could be held liable for its members’ violations of 
                                                                                                                 
130. Id. at 352. 
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132. “Acting under the authority of the Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 
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the Sherman Antitrust Act.141  The Court stated that principals are liable for 
the torts of their agents when the agent acted with apparent authority even 
when the agent acted only to benefit himself.142  Further, the Court 
stipulated that the damages afforded under the Sherman Antitrust Act were 
not punitive in such a way that they would trigger a more restrictive rule on 
liability.143  Instead, the damages were primarily intended as a remedy for 
the victim and as a deterrent for future violations, not as punishment for the 
violator.144  Accordingly, the Court held the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers liable for the indiscretions of its members.145  
Applying the same standard to this case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the Government properly imputed liability on KBR based on an 
employee’s apparent authority; however, the case was remanded for trial to 
determine whether that liability extended to include the particular employee 
in question in this case.146 
C.  Judge Jolly’s Concurrence 
Judge E. Grady Jolly agreed that the case should be remanded, but 
disagreed with the majority’s approach.147  Judge Jolly claimed that the 
majority engaged in a poor attempt of statutory interpretation without 
considering the meaning of words in the statute.148 
The case centered around the language contained in § 55(a)(1) which 
stated that any “person” that knowingly violates the Act is subject to the 
penalties contained in this section.149  The majority quickly determined that 
because “person” was defined to include any “corporation,” vicarious 
liability could be imputed upon a corporation under § 55(a)(1).150  
However, the analysis of the text should not have ended there.151  
According to Judge Jolly, it is important to take the totality of the clause 
into account when determining its meaning.152   
When reading § 55(a) of the Act, it is apparent the word “person” 
applies not only to § 55(a)(1), but also § 55(a)(2).153  Therefore, § 55(a) 
applies to a person (1) who knowingly violates the Act and a person (2) 
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whose employee violates the Act.154  There is no dispute that the word 
“person” includes corporations.155  If the interpretation of the text was to 
end at the word “person,” it must be assumed that it would apply to 
employees of a corporation.156  However, taking the language of § 55(a) as 
a whole, the question then becomes: which employees?157   
Section 55(a)(1) contains language that requires the “person” to have 
knowledge of the violation.158  Due to the nature of a corporation, the 
requisite knowledge must be drawn from the knowledge of an individual 
because corporations cannot in and of themselves possess knowledge of any 
kind.159  Judge Jolly cited Fletcher’s Cyclopedia of Corporations section 
790, which states, “[A] court may deem only the knowledge of officers and 
employees at a certain level of responsibility imputable to the 
corporation.”160  Knowledge of a lower level employee is ordinarily not 
imputed upon a corporation.161  Applying these rules to the text, § 55(a)(1) 
only allows for vicarious liability where the employee’s authority, 
responsibility, or managerial role within the corporation allows for their 
knowledge to be imputed to the corporation.162  “The acts of a corporation’s 
vice-principals are considered to be the acts of the corporation itself;”163 
therefore, the knowledge is not vicarious, but direct.164  If the court were to 
adopt this standard, then vicarious liability may not apply because the 
requisite knowledge may be satisfied by the direct knowledge of the 
corporation.165   
In order to impute an employee’s knowledge to a corporation, the 
employee must not only have apparent authority, but must also have 
sufficient responsibility or authority within the company to attribute his 
knowledge to the corporation itself.166  As a result, the issue of whether 
§ 55(a)(1) allows for vicarious liability and whether the specific employee 
in this case has the apparent authority to bind the corporation are not 
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exclusive.167  In fact, it is the same set of questions that must be answered 
by a consideration of the facts of the case.168   
Judge Jolly also distinguished that § 55(a)(2) of the statute imposed 
strict liability on corporations whether or not the violation was known 
because corporations are typically held liable for the torts of employees 
who act within the scope of their employment.169  Therefore, if the “scope 
of employment” or “apparent authority” tests were applied to § 55(a)(2), the 
analysis would be identical and hold a corporation redundantly liable under 
both sections for any violations.170  However, because § 55(a)(1) included 
the scienter requirement, the analysis should not be the same.171  Without 
knowing more facts of the case, it is impossible to say that the knowledge 
of the specific employee in this case was sufficient to impose vicarious 
liability upon the corporation.172  As a result, Judge Jolly agreed that the 
case should be reversed and remanded for trial.173 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In this case, the majority inappropriately determined that vicarious 
liability could be imputed to a corporation under § 55(a)(1) of the Act.  Part 
A of this section argues why the majority’s dismissal of the punitive 
characteristics of the damages clause was a determining factor in its 
application of vicarious liability.  Part B argues why the majority’s 
disregard of the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal rule of agency was 
overly dismissive.   
A.  The majority’s dismissal of the punitive characteristics of the penalties 
in the Act was a determining factor in its application of vicarious liability. 
 In this case, the majority concluded early that § 55(a)(1) of the Act 
allowed the application of vicarious liability to a corporation by simply 
substituting “corporation” for “person” without considering the meaning of 
the clause in its entirety.174  With that simple substitution, § 55(a)(1) states, 
“the Federal Government . . . may recover from a [corporation] that 
knowingly engages in [prohibited conduct] . . . .”175  However, ending the 
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interpretation here would not fully answer the question at hand.176  As 
Judge Jolly explained in his concurrence, the determination of whether 
vicarious liability could be applied to this clause does not end at the 
substitution of the word “person” for “corporation.”177  The majority should 
have continued its analysis to determine whether the knowledge of an 
individual could be imputed upon a corporation to hold that corporation 
liable for knowing violations of the Act.178  The exercise of statutory 
interpretation is more complex than the simple substitution the majority 
applied.179 
 In this case, the majority failed to recognize that the nature of the 
damages recoverable under the clause is determinative as to the application 
of imputed knowledge of a corporation.180  The court should have 
determined whether § 55(a)(1) was punitive or remedial prior to deciding 
whether vicarious liability could be imposed upon a corporation.181 
1. It is not clear whether the damages contained in § 55(a)(1) of the Act are 
punitive or remedial. 
Because this is a case of first impression regarding the Act, the court 
should look to the interpretation of similar statutes, such as the False 
Claims Act182, for guidance.183  The False Claims Act contains a “double 
damages” penalty clause that compares to the Anti-Kickback Act.184  Under 
the False Claims Act, a person or corporation who  
knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or 
statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to 
the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly 
avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to 
the Government, is liable to the United States Government for a civil 
penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, as adjusted by 
the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, plus 3 times 
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the amount of the damages which the Government sustains because of the 
act of that person.185  
In United States ex rel. Brensilber v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the forfeiture and damage 
provisions of the False Claim Act were “not only penal, but drastically 
penal. . . [and f]or this reason, it has been strictly construed.”186  In Hyslop 
v. United States, the Eighth Circuit likewise held this forfeiture clause penal 
in nature.187  Contrarily, in a split decision in United States ex rel. Marcus 
v. Hess, the Supreme Court held that the “double damages” clause of the 
False Claims Act was “remedial” because it merely “afford[ed] the 
Government complete indemnity for the injuries done to it.”188  The Third 
and Fourth Circuits agreed with this holding, and found that the clause was 
remedial in nature and imposed only restitutionary damages.189  In more 
recent cases, it seems the U.S. Supreme Court has shifted its view from 
Hess and has held that the forfeiture provisions of the False Claims Act are, 
indeed, punitive and not merely compensatory, especially in cases where 
the Government seeks to recover damages that exceedingly outweigh its 
actual loss.190  The D.C. and Fifth Circuits have applied the same standard 
in United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Technical Institute, Inc. 
and United States v. Ridglea State Bank.191 
Although courts, including the Supreme Court, are divided about 
whether similar statutory clauses are punitive, the trend is shifting toward 
considering “double damages” clauses punitive.192  If it is determined to be 
punitive, then the clause should be strictly construed to only impute the 
requisite intent or knowledge of the actor to a corporation when the 
authority of the actor is clear: typically, when the corporation either 
expressly authorized or ratified the actions.193   
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2. The principal cannot be held vicariously liable for punitive damages for 
the unauthorized misdeeds of its agent. 
 Historically, courts have been divided as to whether statutory clauses 
like the one in § 55(a)(1) of the Act are punitive or remedial; however, it is 
imperative that a court evaluate the nature of the clause before considering 
whether a corporation may be held vicariously liable.  When a clause has 
been determined to be punitive, courts have consistently held that an 
employer cannot be held liable for the unauthorized misdeeds of its 
employees.194  As a result, if the clause does impose punitive damages, then 
it must be strictly construed to apply only to corporations that have ratified 
or otherwise authorized the Act.195 
 In Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad Co. v. Prentice, the 
Court held that a principal could not be held liable for exemplary or 
punitive damages merely by reason of wanton, oppressive, or malicious 
intent on the part of the agent.196  In Hyslop, the Court opined that the 
punitive clause must be strictly construed, limiting the scope of vicarious 
liability against government prime contractors to cases where authorization 
was clear.197  In 1999, the Court reaffirmed the limited application of 
vicarious liability for punitive damages saying that it was improper to 
punish someone (e.g., a corporation) for the acts of another.198  The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed in Ridglea saying it was against established 
agency-law principles and unjust to hold an employer liable for the 
unauthorized, illegal acts of the employee.199    
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which deals with employment 
discrimination, was amended in 1991 to include punitive penalties against 
corporations or individuals who intentionally violate Title VII.200  Because 
of the punitive nature of the penalties, courts have held that the statute must 
be strictly construed.201  The Fourth Circuit addressed a Title VII Civil 
Rights case in Harris v. L&L Wings, Inc. and explained at great length that 
punitive damages should only be awarded in cases of egregious conduct.202  
In 1999, the Eleventh Circuit agreed in Dudley v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., and 
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held that punitive damages, under Title VII, should be reserved for 
egregious cases.203 In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, the U.S. Supreme 
Court applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 909 approach in 
conjunction with the Restatement of Agency’s “scope of employment” rule 
stating that holding an employer vicariously liable for punitive damages as 
a result of the actions of any of its employees was improper because it 
would punish a party who was personally innocent.204  The Court explained 
that a corporation may be held liable for punitive damages as a result of the 
actions of its employees only in the limited circumstances where the 
corporation authorized or ratified the wrongful acts.205   
In Kolstad, the U.S. Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to a Title 
VII Civil Rights case and articulated that the policy behind applying such 
scrutiny to punitive clauses is that it would be improper to punish a person 
or corporation for the acts of another.206  The Fifth Circuit previously 
applied the same standard in Ridglea.207 
 In Ridglea, the court opined that an employer could not be held liable 
for double damages under the False Claims Act’s “double damages” clause 
because the award sought by the Government was grossly disproportionate 
to the damages incurred.208  In that case, the False Claims Act provided for 
the Government to receive double the amount of actual losses plus an 
automatic forfeiture of $2,000 per occurrence.209  Even though the 
Government’s actual losses totaled $2,038.62, it sought damages totaling 
$23,591.14, including the automatic forfeitures.210  Section 55(a)(1) of the 
Anti-Kickback Act nearly mirrors the language of the False Claims Act by 
allowing the Government to receive double the amount of the kickback plus 
$11,000211 for each occurrence.212  Because the statutes are so similar, the 
court should consistently interpret their meanings.213  To do otherwise 
would leave government contractors without clear guidance or expectations 
concerning their conduct under the Acts.214 
                                                                                                                 
203. Dudley, 166 F.3d at 1322–23. 
204. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 528. 
205. Id. at 526. 
206. Id. 
207. United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 1966). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 499. 
210. Id.  
211. “Acting under the authority of the Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 
1990, 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (2006), the Department of Justice increased the amount of the penalty in 
§55(a)(1)(B) from $10,000, its original statutory amount, to $11,000.  28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(13).”   
United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 347 n.6 (5th Cir. 2013). 
212. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2009); see also 41 U.S.C. § 55 (1986), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706 
(2011). 
213. 2B SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 53:3 (7th ed. 2013). 
214. Id.  
368 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 39 
 
 Because of the obvious discrepancy in the court’s rulings in these 
cases, the majority reconciled its holding with its earlier ruling in Ridglea 
by distinguishing the specific language of the clauses.215  The False Claims 
Act contains language that mandates an automatic forfeiture of $2,000 per 
occurrence, and the court does not have discretion to award a lesser 
amount.216  This Act, on the other hand, contains language that allows the 
government to recover up to $11,000 per occurrence.217  Because the court 
may decide the amount of damages actually awarded, the majority 
explained, the clause of this Act is unique from the False Claims Act and 
may be interpreted differently.218 
 The majority’s minimalist approach to statutory interpretation in this 
case is not persuasive.  Even though the language of the clauses may be 
distinguished, the effect is the same.  In Kellogg, the violating employees 
received nominal kickbacks including golf outings, sports tickets, drinks, 
and meals.219  The value of these kickbacks in total was inconsequential 
compared to the amount of damages sought by the Government.220  In 
Ridglea, the court applied a strict standard because the damages the 
Government was seeking were grossly disproportionate to the actual loss.221  
The same is true here.  As the majority has applied the statute, the 
Government is entitled to receive double the value of the kickbacks plus 
$11,000 for every occurrence.222  As the government has alleged in this 
case, those damages could total more than $1,700,000.223  The kickbacks 
actually received by KBR employees for which the government may have 
been charged pale in comparison to such a staggering penalty.224 
 In Ridglea, the same Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that it was 
against established agency-law principles and unjust to hold an employer 
liable for the unauthorized, illegal acts of the employee.225  Because the 
statutory language from Kellogg relates so closely to the language in 
Ridglea, the court should have applied the same reasoning in this case.226 
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B.  The majority’s disregard of the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal rule 
of agency was overly dismissive. 
Traditionally, the Fifth Circuit has conservatively imputed vicarious 
liability to a corporation in limited circumstances where the employee was 
acting within the scope of his employment or acting for the benefit of his 
employer.227  This application has been extended to cases where the 
employee acted with the purpose to benefit the employer even if the 
employer did not actually receive a benefit.228  On the other hand, the court 
has declined to apply vicarious liability in cases where the employee acted 
for his own benefit and not for the benefit of the employer.229  Nevertheless, 
the majority in this case rejected the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal 
doctrine and downplayed its importance by burying the issue in its 
discussion of the punitive damages question addressed in Part A.  In cases 
like the one at bar, the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal doctrine is 
inextricably intertwined with the application of punitive damages, but the 
test and its effects are independent and distinct. 
Two decisions from the Fifth District are on point with the issue in 
Kellogg: Ridglea230 and Hangar One.231  In Ridglea, a bank vice president 
approved false loan documents for submission to the Federal Housing 
Administration knowing the loans would default.232  The court found that 
the employee knew the loans would default and the bank would not benefit 
from them; contrarily, the bank would lose money on the transaction.233  
Therefore, the bank could not be held liable for his misdeeds.234  In Hangar 
One, the corporation was a prime contractor for the U.S. Department of 
Defense that provided ammunition during the Vietnam War.235  Some of the 
corporation’s employees were overlooking defects in the ammunition on 
the production lines and allowing defective ammunition to be sold to the 
Government.236  Because there was no benefit in providing defecting 
ammunition to the Government, the court held that the corporation could 
not be held liable for the actions of its employees because the employees 
were not acting to benefit the corporation.237 
                                                                                                                 
227. See Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 500; see also Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 
128 (5th Cir. 1962). 
228. Standard Oil, 307 F.2d at 128. 
229. Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 500. 
230. Id. 
231. United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155, 1155 (5th Cir. 1977). 
232. Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 498. 
233. Id. 
234. Id.  
235. Hangar One, 563 F.2d at 1157. 
236. Id.  
237. Id. at 1158. 
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Standard Oil was a case involving criminal liability under the Hot Oil 
Act.238  The court held that the employer, Standard Oil, was not criminally 
liable because vicarious liability did not apply in cases where the employee 
did not act for the benefit of the employer.239  In Ridglea, the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed Standard Oil by applying the same test to a civil statutory 
violation.240  However, in Kellogg, the majority declined to apply such a 
test.241  Utilizing the same rationale as discussed in Part A supra, the 
majority reasoned that the statutory penalty in the Anti-Kickback Act did 
not impose mandatory punitive damages as in the False Claims Act; 
therefore, the employee need not have acted for the benefit of the employer 
in order for the Government to recover.242  This disregard of the act-for-the-
benefit-of-the-principal was incorrect. 
 In Kellogg, the employees were not accepting kickbacks from 
subcontractors for the benefit of the corporation.243  They were accepting 
the kickbacks for their own benefit.244  The Government could hardly 
contend that golf outings and sports tickets furthered the mission of the 
corporation.  Consequentially, if the majority had applied the act-for-the-
benefit-of-the-principal standard to this case, it would have found that 
vicarious liability could not be imputed to the corporation under § 55(a)(1) 
of the Act. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 The Fifth District Court of Appeals incorrectly decided that § 55(a)(1) 
of the Anti-Kickback Act allows vicarious liability to be imputed to a 
corporation for the acts of its employees.  Its limited statutory interpretation 
left the clause no more “interpreted” after its evaluation than before.  The 
issue of whether “person” included “corporation” was not in dispute.  The 
deciding factor was whether the corporation had the requisite knowledge to 
satisfy the clause.  Even though there are many tests to determine whether 
vicarious liability applies, and subsequently what “knowledge” may be 
imputed to the corporation, this court failed to consider the punitive nature 
of the damages sought and rejected its own precedent by refusing to apply 
the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal doctrine.  Had the majority followed 
its own precedent, the decision to apply vicarious liability would have been 
quite different.  In this case, the majority turned a blind eye to the 
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240. United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 1966). 
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similarities between its prior decisions and the case at hand and 
subsequently failed to consistently apply vicarious liability to corporate 
defendants.   

